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typical mathematical techniques which include axiomatic method, invariance
principles, equivalence relations and functional correspondences.
Introduction
Mathematical abstraction is the process of considering and manipulating op-
erations, rules, methods and concepts divested from their reference to real
world phenomena and circumstances, and also deprived from the content con-
nected to particular applications. So the abstract concept of number does not
come down to any real aggregate (of sheep, beans, pencils, etc.) nor to any
conceived collection (of geometrical points, numerical elements, unspeciﬁed el-
ements, etc.) and it includes sets of numbers with rules of calculation diﬀerent
from the usual ones, such as the rules for quaternions, octonions, etc.
Actually, in mathematics, one encounters from the very beginning not
one but several abstraction processes, which constitute speciﬁc and perma-
nent ways of developing the mathematical core. In modern times, especially
from the 19th century onwards, abstraction ﬂourishes, and various processes
are more systematically piled up, concatenated, and blended for producing
procedures, entities, structures, and theories at higher and higher levels of
abstraction. Abstracting is an ongoing innovation processing, which expands
the mathematical stuﬀ and makes it still richer and more and more intricate
and layered.
I am not aiming at tackling head-on the fundamental question: What is
an abstract object? or In which sense abstract objects `exist'?1 My purpose
is much more modest and my method is mainly descriptive. I want to establish
a picture of diﬀerent and recurring procedures of mathematical abstraction.
Thus, I will focus on diﬀerent features of mathematical practice while I will
disregard (explicit or implicit) ontological stands about the nature of mathe-
matics and the status of its abstract objects. My purpose is epistemological,
and it concerns the actual ways of performing abstraction in mathematical
doing.2 On the way I shall inevitably display how I see the means and prod-
ucts of mathematical activity. I think that focussing on actual mathematical
abstraction processes may aﬀord a positive picture of what is mathematical
abstraction. I mean that we may come across criteria for being abstract that
are not obtained by the classical way of negation, an abstract object being
1. For discussing such questions belonging to the heroic tradition in the philoso-
phy of mathematics [Kreisel 1985], see among others [Burgess & Rosen 1997], [Zalta
1983], [Rosen 2012], [Parsons 2008].
2. My approach seems to be similar to Jean-Pierre Marquis' approach in [Marquis
forthcoming]. J.-P. Marquis makes ﬁne distinctions between symbolic, formal, and
abstract, and also between abstraction and generalization.
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not located in space and time and not causally active.3 I am rather taking
the way of example despite its limits.
I will begin by a rapid incursion into the philosophical corpus. As a method
I will focus on how the terms abstract and abstraction have been and are
used; perforce I shall get information about the terms concept and concep-
tualization, thanks to which I can make precise my understanding of mathe-
matical concepts. I will then try to parallel the outcome of my inquiry with
speciﬁc mathematical techniques: as a result we will notice that mathematical
abstraction is not reducible to logical abstraction, at least as it was under-
stood in the Aristotelian tradition. Thirdly, I attempt to describe the fun-
damental thinking processes underlying the main ways to get and increase
abstraction, with a special attention to recurrent mathematical actions that
produce more and more abstract objects. As a speciﬁc illustration, I am giving
in a fourth section signiﬁcant or emblematic examples; relying on them I want
to stress that in mathematical practice several abstracting processes work si-
multaneously and interact together, conceptualization and axiomatization be-
ing an important but only one factor in the job of systematic and uniform
problem solving.
1 Philosophical background
Philosophers may have recourse to mathematical practice and history of math-
ematics for making more precise and more substantial the understanding of
some fundamental thought processes, such as abstracting. A philosophical
mean at hand is to focus on the changes in meaning of the terms abstraction
and abstract. Such a semantic analysis provides indeed a crucial basis for
contemporary linguistic, cultural, and conceptual understanding; it is largely
used in conceptual history, which may be internal (considering the rational
links between mathematical concepts and methods) or external, considering
the institutional, political, and social environment which promotes or ﬁghts
some typical way of thinking and acting: for instance, in mathematics abstrac-
tion has been viewed as a royal route of invention in Hilbert's and E. N÷ther's
school and, at nearly the same time, as a degenerate trend destroying the vi-
tality of intuition in the ideology of the Deutsche Mathematik championed
by Ludwig Bieberbach and Oswald Teichmüller. For my part, I see no un-
bridgeable gap between abstraction and intuition, since insights may bring in
abstraction processing and follow from it as well. As some mathematicians
(E. Artin, A. Weil, and others) maintain, there is indeed a symbolic and ab-
stract intuition. Anyway, I am not aiming at discussing here the question
of axiomatic or logic versus intuition, which was the focus of intense debates
3. See [Burgess & Rosen 1997, 20]. The now standard expression way of negation
was coined by Lewis in his book [Lewis 1986].
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during the 20th century and still is one of the main issues of the philosophy of
mathematics.
To the question What is meaning?, I will give Quine's answer: Meaning
is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and
wedded to the word. Let me quote the whole passage:
The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of
the modern notion of intension or meaning... Things had essences
for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning
is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of
reference and wedded to the word. [Quine 1951, 22], see also
[Quine 1990, 88]
Actually, I am taking the divorce of meaning from object of reference as a
methodological device for avoiding ontological considerations and focussing on
what and how we know rather than on what we believe or what we assume
or must assume in order to give a philosophical account of some mathemat-
ical actions or attitudes. I am not saying that epistemological views do not
commit to ontological assumptions, I am just saying that I will leave aside
those possible commitments and the inﬂuence that they might have on actual
knowledge processes and on our theoretical explanation of those processes.
1.1 Abstraction and concept-formation
Abstraction is an essential knowledge process, the process (or, to some, the
alleged process) by which we form concepts. It consists in recognizing one
or several common features or attributes (properties, predicates) in individ-
uals, and on that basis stating a concept subsuming those common features
or attributes. Concept is an idea, associated with a word expressing a prop-
erty or a collection of properties inferred or derived from diﬀerent samples.
Subsumption is the logical technique to get generality from particulars.
This rough description complies with Aristotle's account of ἀφαίρεσις:
Considering diﬀerent things we subtract, remove, take away their particulari-
ties and retain only what they have in common. The concept of man applies to
all humans, male or female, tall or short, blond or brown, etc.; the concept of
triangle applies to any triangle, rectangle, equilateral or isosceles. According
to Aristotle, concepts are immaterial ideas attached to material things; they
exist within things on which they are predicated.4
There is a discussion about the nature of Aristotelian abstraction. Frege,
and some Aristotle's experts such as David Ross and H.G. Apostle give a
psychological interpretation. By contrast John Cleary claims5 that ἀφαίρεσις
4. A little more on Aristotle's abstraction in [Szczeciniarz 1999, 45]. More in
[Cleary 1985, 1345].
5. See [Cleary 1985, 3536]. On Aristotle's view about abstract objects as a result
of subtraction: τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα, τὰ δι΄ ἀφαιρέσεως, τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα
see Metaphysics, µ, 13.
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that he rightly translates by subtraction, deprivation (in contrast with
piρόσθεσις, to which corresponds addition), is the logical method which is
used to identify and isolate the primary subject of predication for any given
attributes (Posterior Analytics), and which consequently legitimates the intel-
lectual separation of abstract objects.
Anyway, abstraction is the process of passing from things to ideas, prop-
erties and relations, to properties of relations and relations of properties, to
properties of relations between properties, etc. Being a fundamental thinking
process, abstraction has two faces: a logical face and evidently a psychological
aspect that is the target of cognitive sciences.
John Locke (1632-1704) introduced particular ideas between individuals
and general ideas. On a ﬁrst step, particular ideas gather individuals into
a class; on a second step, general ideas are created through the process of
abstracting, drawing away, or removing the uncommon characteristics from
several particular ideas. For example, the abstract general idea or concept
that is designated by the word red is that characteristic which is common to
the particular ideas (particular concepts) of apples, cherries, and blood. Thus,
is pointed out the fact that the abstracting process forms a scale with at least
two steps, and general concepts come loose from things. Locke writes indeed:
General and universal belong not to the real existence of things;
but are Inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by
it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.
[Locke 1689]
In contrast with Aristotle's ontological and logical point of view, Locke's stand-
point is squarely epistemological. Note also that ideas may play the role of
signs; later on, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) developed his semiotic phi-
losophy on a very similar perspective.
1.2 Concepts
Developing further on Locke's approach, let us abandon Plato's and Aristotle's
view that concepts are universal, unchanging ideal objects grasped by the un-
derstanding or made up in conformance with pre-existent relations in the real
world. Concepts result indeed from the logical operation of subtraction but
they do not have an eternal existence in some heavens of universal forms, sep-
arate from particulars as thought Plato or not separate as argued Aristotle. In
my opinion, concepts are historical products of the mind's activity and their
emergence depends on many theoretical, cultural, social, economical, and po-
litical data. Nevertheless concepts are or may be objective, since they help to
grasp, to express in a most communicable way (at least in principle), and to
master, within variable limits, phenomena of the real world.
To stress the objectivity of scientiﬁc concepts, the semantic tradition in
philosophy [Bolzano (1781-1848), Frege (1848-1925), Husserl (1859-1938), and
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their followers] proposed to consider the sphere of concepts as autonomous.
The aim was to separate semantic phenomena from their linguistic expres-
sions and from their mental representations [Vorstellungen]. But grounding
the semantic sphere on itself may lead to erase the historical character of its
elements and to give them an immutable ontological status. It is well known
that, in order to ground the objectivity of scientiﬁc concepts, Gottlob Frege
proposed to locate concepts in a third realm, the realm of abstract ob-
jects, which are neither sensible nor mental. Frege's abstract objects are
not objects, they are meanings, more precisely timeless everlasting meanings.
Given a linguistic expression F , Frege named the meaning of F its conceptual
content [begriicher Inhalt ]. A conceptual content is either always true or
always false. Frege argues that we cannot create meanings, and that we can
only grasp them; he considers also meanings as if they were a priori essences
that we have to discover. Abstract objects are, in Frege's perspective, mean-
ings in themselves, just like the old things in themselves. That gave birth
to philosophical endless and currently ongoing discussions, with a revival of
Platonic tendencies.
The semantic tradition was a reaction against the promotion of the Subject
by Descartes, Kant, and Hegel among others, and an attempt to save the
alleged eternal character of scientiﬁc truths. But from a more pragmatic point
of view there is no need to ground semantic objectivity on objects ﬁxed and
independent from the mind, whose accessibility would then be questionable,
as pointed out P. Benacerraf [Benacerraf 1973]. The divorce of conceptual ob-
jectivity from ﬁx and everlasting objects is not new. Georg Kreisel has pointed
it out many times in his papers. Grounding on that I want to consider objec-
tivity as resulting from a successful interaction between the rational activity
of the understanding and the environment.
Concepts are also products and tools of thinking and reasoning; and they
do not exist in the mind before the abstracting act. In Kant's terms they are
a posteriori, i.e., they arise out of experience, experience being taken by me
in an as wide as possible sense, and not in its Kantian sense, which is limited
to perceptual or physical experience. I would then say that a concept is a
thought-object, which results from a subtractive process that constructs the
unity under which several speciﬁc thought-objects, rather than several rough
physical objects, may be gathered.
Mathematical activity is concerned with thought-objects rather than with
objects, even in the case of important impulse given by physical, biological,
economic, or sociological phenomena. Mathematical entities are products of
the activity of the understanding; they appear in a particular presentation
[Darstellung ]6, which might be modiﬁed or replaced by another one. In other
6. It is necessary to make a distinction between the word presentation
[Darstellung], which means the objective mathematical way of introducing or us-
ing a concept, and the word: representation [Vorstellung], which has here its usual
meaning of a subjective mental content. Moreover, when an element a of a set E
Facets and Levels of Mathematical Abstraction 87
words, we have access to mathematical entities only through the concepts
we form for expressing some of the properties we want to take as a basis for
developing our knowledge concerning those entities and many others that come
to be related to them.
Abstraction involves perceiving something, relating it to other
things, grasping some common trait of those things, and conceiv-
ing of the common trait as to it can be related not only to those
things but also to other similar things. [Locke 1689, 1, 20]
A mathematical concept is the association of a meaning (conceptual content)
with a sign. Generally, once adopted by a mathematical community, a sign
does not change, for instance, the notation dx, the notation
∫
, or the Arabic
numerals. But the meaning associated with a sign may evolve. Notably, for
instance, the concept of function and the sign
∫
have now a meaning diﬀer-
ent from the one that they had ﬁrst in the 17th and 18th centuries; and they
have now diﬀerent meanings in set theory and in category theory. Actually,
mathematical activity is concerned with the processes of continuous transfor-
mation of a given presentation into others: meaning changes, aﬀording new
concepts for the presumed same entity; new procedures are introduced at some
point of time and reveal new aspects of our most familiar tools, new notations
are proposed for designating the innovative concepts. Finally, a mathematical
entity is the pair constituted by the idea of a supposed unique substrate des-
ignated by a name and its many actual and potential aspects or presentations,
including the operations and rules of calculation set up in each case.7 In other
words, a mathematical entity is the virtual referent, supposedly common to
similar but distinct concepts. Dedekind-Peano concept of positive integers is
not the same as Euclid's concept, even though both refer to the more or less
same entity.
Concepts are formed gradually, through reason's indefatigable abstracting
work, organizing similarities and diﬀerences, dissolving hidden links and cre-
ating links that were unnoticed. They are not obvious to whom who is not
trained in this kind of work. Not everybody knows Dedekind-Peano deﬁnition
or even Euclid's deﬁnition of numbers. Experience rather than pure intuition is
at work. New insights are gained thanks to growing knowledge and experience.
1.3 Abstract and concrete concepts
One distinguishes sometimes abstract concepts from concrete concepts. Since
any concept results from an abstracting process, what is a concrete concept?
belongs to some equivalence class A ⊂ E, we say that a is a representative for A;
that means that a stands for any element belonging to A, what again has nothing to
do with a subjective (mental) representation.
7. In my view, it is hard to isolate completely the substrate entity from the oper-
ations attached to it. From an abstract point of view operations and properties are
even more important than their speciﬁc substrate.
88 Hourya Benis Sinaceur
In Latin, concretus means mixed, composite, compound, while the
Latin word abstractus means withdrawn, taken out of, extracted (or
isolated), estranged. That is all that is contained in the original etymologi-
cal meaning of these words. The rest pertains to the philosophical conception
that is expressed through them.
1.3.1. In one sense, a concrete concept is the concept of one or many con-
crete sensible things: so the concepts of this table, of one apple, of ﬁve pencils,
as concepts of perceived things. Concrete pertains to the direct sensory
referents understood under a concept, while abstract hints to non-sensory
referents, which are the result of a repeated operation of extracting a general
idea from more particular ideas. In this sense one usually makes a radical but
rough diﬀerence between concrete and abstract, actual and unreal, perceptible
and imperceptible. However in science to be given to the senses is an unsat-
isfying criterion for the demarcation between concrete and abstract entities:
elementary particles are non-sensible entities and concrete data of physical
experiment. The problem of ﬁnding a criterion satisfying in any case is a diﬃ-
cult one, and I will not undertake to solve it because, from an epistemological
point of view, the distinction between abstract and concrete is relative and
unstable: a concept F may be more abstract than a concept G, which may
itself be abstract but less abstract, i.e., more concrete than F . Leibniz said
in Nouveaux Essais that concreteness and abstractness are correlated; that
means that concreteness and abstractness are a question of more or less rather
than a question of yes or no. Cognitive scientists conﬁrm experimentally in-
deed the gradation of the process beginning with a direct categorization on
perceptual objects and continuing with categorizations at higher and higher
levels on more and more abstract objects.
Moreover, an interesting view comes from results of psychological exper-
iment: concreteness is mostly associated with perceptual features of some
speciﬁc situation, which is generally caught in a global view, while abstract-
ness points to a wide range of diverse situations embedding diﬀerent (kinds
of) entities, connected in some way, and a variety of processes attached to
these (kinds of) entities. And it is suggested that there is a greater engage-
ment of the verbal brain (left cerebral hemisphere) system for processing of
abstract concepts and a greater engagement of the perceptual brain system
(right cerebral hemisphere) for processing of concrete concepts. An abstract
concept is understood through verbal-thinking working out, a concrete con-
cept is visualized: I have either a direct perception or at least a mental image
of a table or of ﬁve apples. That may explain how mathematical working con-
sists partly in making easier the access to mathematical concepts and their
handling through visualization on the blackboard or on a sheet of paper or in
the imagination: we use symbols, we draw ﬁgures and diagrams, and we write
down calculations and formulae. We may even maintain that reasoning and
proving through mere analysis of symbolic formulae, as in Sturm-Liouville the-
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ory of diﬀerential equations,8 or through diagrams, as in category theory,9 are
concrete handling with abstract constructions. We manipulate formulae and
diagrams as being themselves mathematical objects, detecting properties not
being otherwise discerned. It is known that prodigy people who are capable
to make quickly calculations with great numbers perceive sounds or pictures
emotionally associated with numbers. Daniel Tammet says that when he is
calculating the decimals of pi he sees the numerals passing before his eyes like
the pictures of a movie.10 It seems indeed that gifted mathematicians see
the world through mathematical ﬁlters. The French neuroscientist Stanislas
Dehaene thinks that
Presumably, one can become a mathematical genius only if one
has an outstanding capacity for forming vivid mental represen-
tations of abstract mathematical conceptsmental images that
soon turn into an illusion, eclipsing the human origins of math-
ematical objects and endowing them with the semblance of an
independent existence. [Dehaene 2011, 225]
The irresistible leaning to a realist view of the mathematical universe of con-
cepts and techniques has its roots in the actual process of visualizing abstract
procedures.
1.3.2. In a second sense, concrete pertains to our usage and training.
Familiar concepts are taken to be concrete and intuitively (visually) graspable,
e.g., the positive integers, which are called natural numbers qua being the
basic representation of the act of counting. Thus concreteness is a developed
or developing character. According to Kant's Logic:
The expressions abstract and concrete refer not so much to the
concepts themselvesfor any concept is an abstract conceptas
to their usage. And this usage can again have diﬀerent grades;
according as one treats a concept now more, now less abstract or
concrete, that is, takes away from or adds to it now more, now
fewer deﬁnitions. [Kant 1800,  16, Anmerk 1, 154]
In this second perspective, the distinction abstract/concrete is clearly an epis-
temic distinction and it is relative in a sense diﬀerent from that meant by
Leibniz: not only abstract and concrete are correlated concepts, but an ab-
stract concept or construction may become concrete or more concrete and it
may be visualized through a symbol or image or diagram standing materially
for it. That means in fact that we may form, through some kind of drawing,
concrete representations of abstract concepts.
8. Poincaré called that qualitative analysis [Poincaré 1928, XXIXXII].
9. See [Krömer 2007, especially, 8184]: commutative diagrams play a central role.
10. [Tammet 2005]. When D. Tammet multiplies two numbers, he see[s] two
shapes. The image starts to change and evolve, and a third shape emerges. That's
the answer. It's mental imagery. It's like maths without having to think.
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Hegel (1770-1831) introduced important reﬁnements in the distinction con-
crete/abstract. He assumed that any concept is always abstract, but he added
that a genuine concept is not only abstract, but also concrete, in the sense that
its deﬁnitions (what old logic calls features) are combined in it in a single com-
plex expressing its individual unity. A concept is concrete because it contains
all the content of its genesis within it. By contrast immediate perception is
abstract in the sense that its determinations remain undeveloped.11 A concept
is the concrete unity of diﬀerent determinations. Thus the concreteness of a
concept lies in the meaningful cohesion of its features, which may be developed
at diﬀerent moments of time. For instance, out of context, a verbal deﬁnition
is abstract and abstract only. Immersed into the context of a scientiﬁc the-
oretical discourse, any abstract deﬁnition becomes concrete (in an epistemic
sense). The concreteness of a concept is therefore always expressed through
unfolding all its possible deﬁnitions/features in theirmutual connections rather
than through an isolated deﬁnition, and in immersing the concept into a web
of interconnected concepts. It is as to say that ﬂesh is given by the mutual
connections between diﬀerent features of the concept under consideration and
by the links with other concepts. Such a consideration may well be applied to
mathematics: the image of a dense network for representing the mathematical
stuﬀ has become commonplace by now.
2 Mathematical practice
2.1. Mathematical concepts may generally be introduced or deﬁned in dif-
ferent ways. The more presentations [Darstellungen] a concept has and the
more it is embodied by diﬀerent procedures performed in diﬀerent areas, the
more concrete it is taken to be. This may happen through two ways.
a) When a concept is repeatedly used in diﬀerent contextual theories, e.g.,
when we add numbers, vectors, vector spaces, etc., we get a meaning-
generality (semantic generality), which is an extensive generality, a
transversal generality of use. In the same wise, we use products for vec-
tor spaces, groups, topological spaces, Banach spaces, automata, etc. In
each case we have to tell which properties among all the possible proper-
ties of the operation + or ×, such as commutativity, associativity, etc., are
preserved and which must be dropped. The fewer are the properties con-
sidered, the greater is generality. The very general concept of addition is
illustrated by the structure of a monoid, which is instantiated by so many
diﬀerent models. The concreteness comes from the repeated use under rules
speciﬁed in each case.
11. I am simplifying the very suggestive although intricate developments of Hegel's
drittes Buch of [Hegel 1812-1816].
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b) The more connections a concept has, actually or potentially, with other
concepts, the more intricate is its own meaning. Through its meaning-
complexity (semantic complexity or richness)12 a concept gets some kind
of concreteness, it looks like an individuated entity because several opera-
tions along with their properties are combined under it. Concreteness here
is taken in Hegel's sense. In contrast with the traditional ratio between
extension and intension of a concept, it is not the case in mathematics that
increasing meaning complexity entails decreasing meaning generality; for
instance, a category, let us say Grp is at the same time a more general
and a more complex mathematical object than the group structure. Thus,
analysis of mathematical abstraction does not give the same results as the
traditional grammatical or logical analysis of concept formation.
2.2. Creative manipulation of mathematical concepts pertains their mean-
ing, not just their names or nominal deﬁnitions. Names designate things, while
concepts condense meaning even when they appear at ﬁrst sight very abstract.
For instance real numbers may seem so abstract that their mathemati-
cal existence is challenged. They are, indeed, rejected by some constructivist
mathematicians: e.g., instead of speaking of real roots of an algebraic equa-
tion, Kronecker considered intervals bounded by rational quantities, rational
quantities being constructed by a ﬁnite number of operations from the inte-
gers. However, there is a larger notion of constructive existence, as it was
made explicit by Hermann Weyl, who argued that we are entitled to claim
that there exists an α only after having instantiated α [Weyl 1921, 5455].
In this view, real numbers exist since we have encountered instances of
them (e.g., ratio of the side of a square to its diagonal, pi, the base e of the
natural logarithm). The concept of real number, though abstract in the double
sense that we can neither survey all its individual instances nor have a ﬁnite
calculation for each instance, needs not to be eliminated; we rightly reason with
the concept of real number as a set, a collection, and as a domain equipped
with more than only one structure. Putting a structure on a set is stipulating
relations and operations (functions) between the elements of the set and stip-
ulating rules for working with them. In addition to algebraic structures such
as groups, rings, ﬁelds, modules, vector spaces, etc., we have order structures,
metric structures, topologies, diﬀerential structures, categories, among others.
The structural complexity of the real number system emerged gradually
(and mainly in the 19th century) through successive abstractive operations,
12. I thank one of the referees who suggested to use richness rather than com-
plexity. I am taking indeed meaning-complexity not as a kind of mathematical
complexity, algorithmic or measurable in some other way, but as an expression for
the polysemous character of many, if not all mathematical concepts. Number, for
instance, has diﬀerent meanings depending on whether you consider integers or ra-
tional numbers, or real numbers, or quaternions, etc. The polysemous character of
mathematical concepts and symbols has been put to the fore by the rise of abstract
axiomatics (comments might be found in [Benis Sinaceur 1991]).
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disentangling diﬀerent structures that were mixed together, dissociating espe-
cially topological notions from algebraic operations, from the order relation,
and from the metric. As a bearer of several structures, the real numbers appear
compound and multi-faceted, just like individuated physical objects.
Actually, the set of real numbers carries the following standard structures:
 an order: each number is either less or more than every other number.
 an algebraic structure: multiplication and addition make it into a ﬁeld.
 a measure: intervals along the real line have a speciﬁc length, which can
be extended to the Lebesgue measure on many of its subsets.
 a metric: there is a notion of distance between points.
 a geometry: it is equipped with a metric and is ﬂat.
 a topology: there is a notion of open sets.
More signiﬁcant is the possibility of hybrid structures; for instance:
 the order and, independently, the metric structure induce the standard
topology,
 the order and the algebraic structure make this set into a totally ordered
ﬁeld,
 the algebraic structure and the topology make it into a Lie group.
What matters with a structure, that was called concept by German
mathematicians of the Göttingen School, is that it provides us with a new
abstract concept, and, at the same time, it gives a more determined meaning
to the underlying set of speciﬁed or unspeciﬁed elements. It is to say that
abstraction brings a richer, not a poorer meaning, even for more general con-
cepts. In other words, structural complexity brings simultaneously syntactic
and semantic richness. As W.v.O. Quine stressed many times, the creation of
abstract concepts is a semantic ascent,13 which goes hand in hand with the
syntactic ascent.
2.3. Thus, we observe in mathematics something which is close to Hegel's
description of abstract and concrete. What is of concern to us in this de-
scription is that it develops further Kant's epistemological distinction between
abstract concept and concrete concept.
According to Kant, very abstract concepts give little information about
many things, while through concrete concepts we know much about few things.
13. The semantic ascent is the shift from talk of miles to talk of mile, it is what
leads from the material (inhaltlich) mode into the formal mode, to invoke an old
terminology of Carnap; [...] The strategy is one of ascending to a common part
of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, [Quine 1960, 271272]; [Quine
1990, 33].
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To account for the fruitfulness of mathematics, Kant argues that mathemat-
ical knowledge proceeds in concreto, i.e., presents the concept into a pure
and a priori but singular intuition. Thus the division abstract/concrete
integrates the division general/particular and the division class/individual.
Kant tells that the concrete usage of a concept is that which is most close to
the individual.
By contrast, Hegel considers not only the form of knowledge, but also its
content, and he detaches the concreteness from its reference to a real-world
existent individual: we may have a very abstract, a very poor knowledge of an
individual or of a singular situation, while a concept, as a product of knowl-
edge, is an evolving concrete unity, which may get more and more meaning
determinations and, then, become more and more concrete. We thus go from
abstract to concrete and not vice versa. What matters is how much and via
how many ways or viewpoints we know about something at some point of
time; what matters is the knowledge-content, the increasing richness and the
progressive diversiﬁcation of knowledge. Knowledge-content is semantic con-
tent in its historical dimension. Abstractness and concreteness are not ﬁxed
forms of the subjective, empirical or transcendental, act of knowing, they are
characteristics of knowledge as such, of knowledge as historical and objective
product of collective activity. An important gain of that view is that it is now
clear that the division abstract/concrete coincides neither with the division
general/particular nor with the division class/individual.
2.4. Let us return to mathematical practice. If an individual thing (phe-
nomenon, fact, entity, concept, procedure, theory) is not understood through
the concrete interconnection within which it actually emerged, exists, and
develops, that means that only abstract knowledge has been obtained, e.g.,
when one has learned what is a group by learning the group axioms without
knowing the context of their emergence (history) and at least some of the dif-
ferent situations where they can be applied fruitfully for revealing the structure
of a domain or suggesting a solution for some problem (actual practice and
problem-solving). Usually, algebraic concepts produce knowledge when they
are tied to facts and problems belonging to other mathematical areas, arith-
metic, geometry, analysis, topology, etc., or belonging to an earlier stage of the
algebraic trend itself, as it is, e.g., the case for the concept of group. If, on the
other hand, an individual thing is understood in its objective links with other
things forming a coherent network, that means that it has been understood,
realized, known, conceived concretely. In such a perspective we can under-
stand how we may have a concrete knowledge of a highly abstract concept, as
it happens especially in modern mathematics. Thus an abstract concept be-
comes concrete not only through its instantiations (realizations, models), but
also through the theories in which it plays a role, i.e., through the theoretical
or technological applications following from it, and still through the theories
to which it gives birth by being included in a more general abstract concept.
94 Hourya Benis Sinaceur
For instance, the algebraic concept of group is made concrete 1) through its
embodiment in arithmetical and geometrical models, 2) through its use to rep-
resent symmetry in physics and to classify crystal structures in chemistry, and
also 3) through the categorical construction of Grp.
3 Descriptive analysis of the fundamental
thinking processes underlying the main
ways of getting abstraction
The title of this section seems ambitious. However, I must say that since I am
no expert in cognitive sciences, I am essentially relying on a more or less direct
analysis of actual mathematical procedures combined with information got in
cognitive scientists' readings. Cognitive scientists name categorization any
kind of activity that involves association, comparison, analogy, and correspon-
dence between two or more things. I will detail the actions performed in such
an activity, which is in fact the task of getting abstract ideas, from the most
simple to the most sophisticated.
3.1. Abstracting is a result of several overlapping or intertwined thought
operations that I describe now.
 Considering things, not necessarily physical ones, not necessarily located
in space and time.
 Comparing things not in themselves but sub specie generalitatis, i.e.,
comparing them as possible samples of something else, something which
is not necessarily already known but only glimpsed and still relatively
vague or fuzzy. Precision comes later.
 Selecting one or several aspects (qualities, properties, predicates) in the
things submitted to comparison and presumed to have something in
common, then presumed to be classed (subsumed) under some concept.
 Leaving aside or discarding all other aspects, especially speciﬁc substan-
tial or space-time aspects. This operation has been called idealization
because it comes down to extracting a form from sundry situations;
it has been especially promoted in the beginning of the 20th century
by abstract algebra and abstract topology, which made familiar the
study of structures not qua being associated with any speciﬁc instance.
Idealization follows from seeing or guessing some invariant basic proper-
ties attached to a plurality of apparently heterogeneous situations and it
leads to a unifying view of the diﬀerent domains on which we perform the
same type of operations: counting, addition, subtraction, compactiﬁca-
tion, etc. Idealization has also a heuristic role in suggesting a possible
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or unexpected connection with a situation not having been considered
at ﬁrst. The extracted form is not rigid; it may be aﬀected by some con-
trolled variation in passing from a certain type of situations to another
one: the addition of two vector subspaces diﬀers from the addition of
let us say two real numbers.
 Isolating some property or some set of properties of the operation(s) un-
der consideration and viewing them on their own, i.e., transforming the
selected conjunction of predicates into a thought-object (Frege's radi-
cal separation between concept and object does not ﬁt mathematical
practice). Peirce called this kind of transformation reﬂective or hy-
postatic abstraction, Husserl called it thematization. Cavaillès popu-
larized the term thematization, at least among French philosophers.
Thematization is especially important in considering as a whole an in-
ﬁnite collection of things; it played a fundamental role in the emer-
gence of set theory, and it has been consistently codiﬁed within diﬀerent
frames: Russell type theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel system (ZF) and Quine's
system (NF).
Thematization is essential in passing from a set S of elements to its
possibly many structures and from the study of a structure Σ on the
set S to the study of the structure Σ in its own right, i.e., to the study
of a class of homomorphisms between structures of the type Σ. The
standard example is given by the passage from Dedekind's axiomatics
for numbers and Hilbert's axiomatics for geometry to Emmy N÷ther's
style of studying classes of group's homomorphisms, classes of ring's ho-
momorphisms, etc. Attention is paid to homomorphisms rather than
to the sets that are respectively source and target of them. It is that
attitude that changed the face of algebra (see [Artin 1962, 555] and
[Weyl 1935, 433]) opening up a wide domain of research and new stuﬀ
for developing new insights and new procedures typical of the begrif-
ﬂiche Mathematik ,14 which was understood as the study of algebraic
or topological structures considered in and for themselves.
Thematization plays also a role in transforming an abstract object
(predicate, concept matching many items possessing similar structures)
into a concrete object, which becomes element of some larger class,
e.g., the structure of abelian groups viewed as an element of the
category of groups.
Thematization is still involved in analyzing a concept by breaking down
its global unity into components that were formerly tightly connected.
Analysis, in this chemical sense, comes out at idealization and thema-
tization; it is disambiguation of meaning by dissociating and studying
separately characters, which have been intuitively associated during
centuries. It was, e.g., the case when Riemann showed (1854) that not
14. The expression begriiche Mathematik  was coined by Pavel Alexandroﬀ in
his obituary of Emmy N÷ther [Alexandroﬀ 1935].
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every space is a metric space or when Dedekind (1872 or even sooner)
showed that not every space is a continuous space. Thus the concept
of space becomes very general, divested from any particular property,
and simultaneously subject to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. By space we un-
derstand now any set of elements taken as a substrate for some selected
relations and functions and as speciﬁcations we get new subclasses of ob-
jects, in our examples the subclass of metrical spaces and the subclass
of continuous spaces.
More generally, by iterated thematization one pushes further mathemat-
ical conceptual constructions, as it is well illustrated by category theory,
which is a theory of systems of structural theories, treating the notion
of structure in a uniform manner: e.g., sets and usual functions form
the category of sets (Set), groups with group-homomorphisms (which
preserve the group-structure) form the category of groups (Grp), topo-
logical spaces and continuous functions (which preserve the topological
structure) form the category of topological spaces (Top).
Abstracting again, functors are structure-preserving maps between cat-
egories. Functors (arrows) are the very objects of category theory; they
belong to a higher level of abstraction than morphisms, which in their
turn are on a higher level of abstraction than maps. By studying cat-
egories and functors, we are not just studying a class of mathematical
structures and the morphisms between them; we are studying the rela-
tionships between various classes of mathematical structures. This is a
fundamental idea, which ﬁrst surfaced in algebraic topology. Searching
for general invariants makes up the dynamic construction of new layers
of sophisticated abstraction processes. Abstracting yet again, a nat-
ural transformation provides a way of transforming one functor into
another while respecting the internal structure (i.e., the composition of
morphisms) of the categories involved.15 Hence, natural transformations
15. If F and G are functors between the categories C and D, then a natural
transformation η from F to G associates to every object X in C a morphism
ηX : F (X) → G(X) between objects of D, called the component of η at X, such
that for every morphism f : X → Y in C we have:
ηY ◦ F (f) = G(f) ◦ ηX
This equation can conveniently be expressed by the commutative diagram:
F (X)
F (f)−→ F (Y )
ηX ↓ ↓ ηY
G(X) −→
G(f)
G(Y )
The notion of a natural transformation states that a particular map between functors
can be done consistently over an entire category. Informally, a particular map, let us
say an isomorphism between individual objects (not entire categories) is referred to as
a natural isomorphism, meaning implicitly that it is actually deﬁned on the entire
category, and deﬁnes a natural transformation of functors; formalizing this intuition
was a motivating factor in the development of category theory.
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can be considered to be morphisms of functors; they yield the usual ho-
momorphisms of structures in the traditional set theoretical framework.
And so on...
The point is the endless dynamical concatenation of polysemous symbols
and symbolic operations. Of course, this concatenation is not necessarily
linear; it forms a kind of tree with interweaved branches at the same level
and from lower to higher levels, or, as said above, a complicate and dense
network.
 Analogies are concurrent with idealization and thematization. Setting
up, guessing, or looking for analogy16 between sundry situations is a
main way to bring to light similarities, diﬀerences and possible relations
between two or several thought-objects. Combined with idealization and
thematization, analogy is a basic constituent of abstraction.
One makes sometimes a distinction between analogy and abstraction.
Grounding on the emergence of abstract group theory from 1) the the-
ory of algebraic equations, 2) number theory, and 3) geometry, and on
the conception of modern algebra as the study of algebraic structures
which came after 1) abstract group theory, 2) abstract ﬁeld theory and
3) abstract ring theory, Jean-Pierre Marquis argues that it is an em-
pirical fact that analogy concerns two things, while abstraction comes
only when three or more things are considered [Marquis forthcoming,
56]. Reasoning by analogy is indeed transferring information or mean-
ing from a particular situation to another particular situation. A good
example is given by J.-P. Marquis, namely Dedekind's and Weber's work
on algebraic number theory and algebraic functions. Another example is
the transfer of algebraic laws and tools to logic in the works of G. Boole,
A. de Morgan, E. Schröder, etc. Abstraction comes in play when several,
and not only two, domains of entities or several classes of structures are
a priori in question.
Indeed, at a ﬁrst step a theory is abstract when it has a priori a plurality
of models. The plurality criterion is indeed commonly used to distinguish
between concrete or material axiomatics and abstract axiomatics, e.g.,
between Euclid's geometry and Hilbert's axiomatization of Cartesian
geometry,17 which permits to construct diﬀerent geometric models by
selecting diﬀerent sets of axioms. At a second step, domains of entities
are neglected, while one considers a priori a plurality of structures along
with their speciﬁc structure preserving morphisms.
But, even in the earlier stage of considering similarities, diﬀerences and
relations between only two situations belonging to the same domain (or
only two domains of diﬀerent entities or only two structure types) is
16. I have analyzed diﬀerent aspects of the fundamental role of analogy in the
progress of mathematics in [Benis Sinaceur 2000].
17. [Hilbert & Bernays 1934-1939, 20]. In Hilbert's and Bernays' terms the distinc-
tion is between inhaltliche und anschauliche Axiomatik  and formale Axiomatik .
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involved the implicit assumption that it must be some abstract frame-
work in virtue of which the transfer from one situation to the other or
from one domain to the other or from one structure type to the other
is possible. Analysing how analogy works, Henri Poincaré writes that
the mathematician must have a direct insight of what makes the or-
ganic unity of sundry situations.18 Analogy as a guide for mathematical
invention and for great productivity with economy of thought is the
chief theme of Poincaré's talk at the 1908 International Mathematical
Congress. According to Poincaré, the crucial step is the passage from
material to formal19 and from diversity to uniﬁcation: analogy between
materially diﬀerent entities or procedures appears when one sees, con-
structs, or supposes a formal similarity between those entities or pro-
cedures.20 Formal similarity hints to a unique mould, which may serve
for predicting or ﬁnding out unexpected analogies with new items and
which may thus lead to a more precise view of the architecture of the
whole body of mathematics, as it happened with the concept of group.
Thus, searching after analogies involves an abstracting mind, if not yet
a systematic use of the abstract method.21 There is actually a back-
and-forth play between analogy and abstraction: setting up analogies
leads to conceive of an abstract theory and, once an abstract theory is
at hand, it is used to unearth more and deeper analogies.22
18. [Poincaré 1900, 127128]. Notice that Poincaré used unity rather than iden-
tity.
19. Poincaré is using the term formal as the opposite of material and he under-
lines the important role of language in discovering new analogies between domains
sundry at ﬁrst sight, but he does not mean a logically formal language, as it is meant
in Hilbert's and Bernays' Grundlagen.
20. En mathématiques, [...] des éléments variés dont nous disposons, nous pouvons
faire sortir des millions de combinaisons diﬀérentes; mais une de ces combinaisons,
tant qu'elle est isolée, est absolument dépourvue de valeur ; [...] Il en sera tout
autrement le jour où cette combinaison prendra place dans une classe de combinaisons
analogues et où nous aurons remarqué cette analogie; nous ne serons plus en présence
d'un fait, mais d'une loi. Et, ce jour-là, le véritable inventeur, ce ne sera pas l'ouvrier
qui aura patiemment édiﬁé quelques-unes de ces combinaisons, ce sera celui qui aura
mis en évidence leur parenté. [...] Si un résultat nouveau a du prix, c'est quand
en reliant des éléments connus depuis longtemps, mais jusque-là épars et paraissant
étrangers les uns aux autres, il introduit subitement l'ordre là où régnait l'apparence
du désordre. [...] ce n'est pas seulement l'ordre, c'est l'ordre inattendu qui vaut
quelque chose [Poincaré 1908, 168170].
21. See J.-P. Marquis' ﬁne decomposition of the abstract method into four compo-
nents in [Marquis 2012, 910].
22. Saying analogy or similarity is not saying identity. While mathematicians are
using analogies to set up isomorphisms between sets or equivalence between cate-
gories, some cognitive scientists are using the mathematical concept of isomorphism
for giving a theoretical explanation of analogy (see e.g., [Gentner 1983, 155170]).
Facets and Levels of Mathematical Abstraction 99
3.2. Although I have taken examples mainly from modern mathematics, it
must be stressed that abstraction is there from the very ﬁrst beginning. Even
the most elementary notions of mathematics are abstract: the notions of num-
ber, of rectangle or triangle or circle, etc., are abstract notions, i.e., products of
abstracting processes. For instance, whole positive numbers result from several
abstracting processes: associating a symbol with a collection of actual things,
dissociating this symbol from this particular collection and associating it with
any collection of the same number of things, then establishing a one-to-one cor-
respondence between many diﬀerent collections, combining this symbol with
other symbols similarly generated in order to perform operations like addition,
multiplication, and so on. It is only through a long habit that we consider
positive integers as given intuitive concrete objects and geometrical ﬁgures
as concrete spatial visualizations supporting the proof process. Abstraction
is always there and is an ongoing process, becoming more and more sophis-
ticated. As Ch. S. Peirce, E. Husserl and J. Cavaillès argued, abstraction is
constitutive of mathematical thinking and it can be repeatedly exempliﬁed
in the processes of idealizing, thematizing, extracting invariants, and setting
up analogies. The more advanced the abstraction process, the more concrete
the abstract objects becomeclasses, structures, operations as such, functions
as such, morphisms, categories, etc. Thus it is not a paradox to think that,
in mathematics, higher levels of abstraction produce more and more concrete
thought-objects, concrete in the double sense that they are complex, individ-
uated objects with various determinations, and that they become concretely
known and manipulated through symbolic formulation, precise diagrams or
even sketchy drawings. Concrete means simultaneously polysemous23 and
daily handled.
3.3. Ascent towards abstraction is not limited to the logical process of sub-
suming particulars or particular ideas under a more general concept. Notably
Frege rejected the Aristotelian ἀφαίρεσις as being not the only sort of logical
abstraction24 and he dissented from the traditional view on concepts; he used
mathematical tools, namely a functional relation and an equation for stating a
putative logical deﬁnition of the concept of number. In most elementary cases
indeed a mathematical concept encompasses more thought-processes than only
the logical subsumption, to which corresponds the set-theoretic operation of
inclusion. In practice mathematicians are dealing with many sorts of opera-
tions and calculations and many sorts of relationships between structured sets
(one-to-one correspondence and equivalence relation as in the so called Hume's
principle,25 linear transformations, group homomorphisms, morphisms, etc.).
23. On the polysemy or ambiguity of axiomatic concepts, see e.g., [Benis Sinaceur
1991, 191196].
24. Actually, Frege thought that Aristotle's analysis was psychological.
25. The name Hume's principle was coined by George Boolos. This principle
plays a central role in Frege's deﬁnition of numbers, and it says that the number of
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Subsumption is a fundamental level of classiﬁcation, but in mathematics fruit-
fulness and new insights result from combining it with other abstraction pro-
cesses, as Frege made clear in his seminal reform of logic and as I shall illustrate
below by some mathematical examples. I am not saying that the ascent to-
wards abstraction is not a logical ascent from step to step. I am just saying
that, in mathematical practice, at any step, genuine mathematical stuﬀ ﬁlls
the logical move. This is why I have stressed hereinabove that the ascent is at
once semantic and syntactic. Mathematical abstraction is a many-faceted and
multi-leveled process and it leads to a sophisticated and branched hierarchy
of mathematical concepts and operations. Moreover it is not always the case
that the more abstract a concept is the more undetermined it is. For instance,
with just a general concept of set as a collection of any things one does not
go far. If one wants actual and eﬀective work, one must begin by a mean-
ing determination, i.e., by setting up the axioms ruling a consistent usage of
the concept. It happens often that the more abstract is a structure the more
overdetermined and stratiﬁed it is: axiomatics and category theory give many
examples. The mathematical branching of concepts is simultaneously compli-
cation of concepts taken in isolation and clariﬁcation of their mutual links:
bringing to light new and new structures gives more and more power to solve
problems not one by one depending on their particularities but uniformly in
one go grounding on the general structure ﬁtting all of them.
3.1 Abstraction and axiomatization
A rapid look at the history of mathematics, especially of modern mathematics,
shows that abstraction is closely tied up with symbolization and axiomatiza-
tion. Mathematical thinking is thinking with and on symbols and diagrams,
may they be considered as representations or as themselves mathematical ob-
jects. Anyway, creative manipulation of symbols and diagrams does not dwell
only on their drawings; it pertains their meanings and meaningful connections
with other symbols and diagrams. Abstract concepts (abstract structures) are
usually deﬁned by a ﬁnite set of axioms that state the relations to be satis-
ﬁed by candidates for being models of those abstract concepts. But abstract
concepts need not to coincide in every respect with their less abstract counter-
parts; the meaning changes in between,26 it becomes more sharply determined
and yet more ambiguous: not every group is abelian; the multiplication of
Fs is equal to the number of Gs if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence
(a bijection) between the Fs and the Gs. Boolos and other logicians as well have
recognized that Hume's principle is not a logical truth, but from it we can logically
deduce what we now call second-order arithmetic. See [Boolos 1998] or [Zalta 2013].
26. The fact is stressed by J.-P. Marquis in the case of the passage of set and
mapping to abstract set and arrow. Marquis writes : Abstract mathematics, like the
concept of mathematical structure, is open, in the sense that it denotes changes with
respect to the theoretical tool used to interpret and illustrate the concept [Marquis
2012, 2, 11 sqq.].
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integers is symmetric, composition of permutations of three objects is not; in
category theory the term structure has not exactly the same meaning as it
has in set theory and in model theory: structures of structures do not always
reduce to structures of elements (see [Awodey 1996]). There are really diﬀerent
levels of abstraction, even if there are connecting paths between levels.
Mathematicians diﬀerently oriented have recognized axiomatization as an
eﬀective tool for understanding and invention: Dedekind, Hilbert, Emmy
N÷ther, and Emil Artin, but also Poincaré, Weyl, and Brouwer,27 who did
not reject the use of the axiomatic method but rather the view that it might
provide a foundation or dispense with calculation and algorithmic proofs. One
must distinguish between axiomatics as a fruitful mathematical method and
axiomatics as a putative foundation or useless mathematical ideology, which
is an epiphenomenon harmful in teaching. In practice, it would be absurd
to go without the axiomatic contributions: for instance Galois' theory has
been deeply and eﬀectively understood only after Dedekind's, Weber's and
Artin's axiomatic presentations. Working with axioms develops new insights
and ideas: notably the study of categories is an attempt to axiomatically cap-
ture what is commonly found in various classes of related mathematical struc-
tures by relating them to the structure-preserving functions between them. A
systematic study of category theory then allows us to prove general results
about any of these types of mathematical structures directly from the axioms
of a category. Mathematics is always aiming at more and more general results
about more and more complicated structures.
Although axiomatization plays now an indispensable role in mathematical
practice, it is not the only way to make mathematical procedures abstract. I
will now give a non-exhaustive list of other mathematical abstraction processes
that interplay in mathematical thinking and actually illustrate the unceasing
iteration of intertwining processes of setting up invariants, idealizing entities
and procedures, transforming operations into objects (thematizing), bringing
to light analogies between sets, structures, categories, etc.
4 Various samples of mathematical
abstraction processes
1. Representing an inﬁnite numerical sequence by its law of recurrence.
One gets the law by discarding concrete calculation and retaining only how
one passes from any element n to its successor. One does not actually know
all the elements of the sequence but one knows how to generate the sequence.
Here it matters of ﬁnding out a rule of calculation, not a concept, but the rule
27. See e.g., Poincaré's praise of the concept of group [Poincaré 1908]; Weyl,
[Weyl 1932, 349] and [Weyl 1951, 464]; Brouwer's conception of geometrical method
[Brouwer 1909].
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dispenses with enumerating all the elements of the sequence like the concept
of even integers dispenses with enumerating all the multiples of 2.
2. Discarding the speciﬁc nature of the elements forming a sequence, e.g.,
the sequence of positive integers, so as to characterize the order type of the
sequence. For that Dedekind invented the concept of chain.28 What matters
here is neither the integers themselves nor even their generative law by itself,
but the ordering generated by this law (linear discrete order). The level of
abstraction is higher than in the example 1, because we are not concerned
with a particular calculation law valid for one particular sequence but with a
law type generating an order structure suitable for integers and for sequences
of unspeciﬁed elements as well. Dedekind's deﬁnition shows that integers are
a particular instantiation of a general structure; it indicates one way of linking
abstraction and generalization.
3. Combining operations (+, ×, etc.) and selecting properties of these op-
erations (associativity, commutativity, etc.) in order to form diﬀerent kinds
of mathematical structures (concepts): groups, ﬁelds, rings, ideals, lattices,
vector spaces, categories, etc., that connect models originating from diﬀerent
mathematical areas or diﬀerent structures. Abstract concepts are multiply in-
stantiated, they deﬁne not one single model nor a single structure, but classes
of models and classes of structures. This kind of abstraction is really mod-
ern, in contrast with Euclid's axiomatic system for geometry, which concerns
one single model (the real three-dimensional space) of one single structure
(the structure of Euclidean space, realized for instance by the vector space Rn
with the standard inner product and by the vector space of real polynomials
of degree ≤ n with a convenient inner product). In the spirit of Hilbert's
and Bernays' distinction one sets Euclid's material system in contrast with
Hilbert's system in Die Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899) or Dedekind's sys-
tem for arithmetic [Dedekind 1888], which are abstract systems (informally
presented); moreover one makes a diﬀerence between Dedekind/Hilbert's style
and Emmy Noether's style of abstraction.
In the perspective of abstract set theory we are using, for instance, the
following terms, which mostly appeared in the 19th century:
 abstract set, which surfaces in Cantor's matured theory,
 abstract group: Dedekind recognized similarities among various math-
ematical structures, like rotations and quaternions, and identiﬁed them
as instances of the abstract notion of group [Dedekind 1855-1858, 439].
Heinrich Weber gave, in 1882, axiom systems for groups, and later on
28. A chain is the minimal closure of a set A in a set B containing A under a
function f on B (where being minimal is conceived of in terms of the general notion
of intersection).
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these axiom systems have been formalized and investigated in their
own right.
 abstract number, which was used, for instance, by Bolzano in the sense
of number as a single entity and in contrast with concrete number, which
is number associated to the things being counted [Bolzano 1851]. We
owe the abstract axiomatic characterization of the sequence of positive
integers to Dedekind through the deﬁnition 73 of [Dedekind 1888]:
If in the consideration of a simply inﬁnite system N set in or-
der by a transformation φ we entirely neglect the special char-
acter of the elements; simply retaining their distinguishability
and taking into account only the relations to one another in
which they are placed by the order-setting transformation φ,
then are these elements called natural numbers or ordinal
numbers or simply numbers, and the base-element 1 is called
the base-number of the number-series N . With reference to
this freeing the elements from every other content (abstrac-
tion) we are justiﬁed in calling numbers a free creation of
the human mind. The relations or laws which are derived
entirely from the conditions α, β, γ, δ in (71) and therefore
are always the same in all ordered simply inﬁnite systems,
whatever names may happen to be given to the individual
elements (compare 134), form the ﬁrst object of the science
of numbers or arithmetic.
 abstract ﬁeld: this structure has been deﬁned by Steinitz [Steinitz
1910].
 abstract space: it surfaced in Riemann's famous paper [Riemann 1854],
where a topology and a metric for a space E is deﬁned before deﬁning
the functions having their arguments and values in E. From 1914 on-
wards ([Hausdorﬀ 1914]) it was known that a topological space was a
set structured by a lattice of open subsets. But it was not until the
middle thirties, with the work of Marshall Stone (1903-1989) on the
topological representation of Boolean algebras and distributive lattices
that this connection between topology and lattice theory began to be ex-
ploited, and it became clear that it is possible to construct topologically
interesting spaces from purely algebraic data.
 In the categorical perspective we are using morphism, which is the
abstract generalization of structure-preserving mappings between two
mathematical structures. In set theory, morphisms are functions; in
linear algebra they are linear transformations; in group theory, they are
group homomorphisms; in topology, they are continuous functions, in
manifold theory they are smooth functions (functions having derivatives
of all orders), and so on.
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4. Classifying: This action may be direct as when one collects elements
in a setby the way it is epistemologically meaningful that for collecting
Kronecker said begriich zusammenfassen, expression that might have been
come under Dedekind's pen, while Cantor used the presumptive ontological
zusammensein, or when one collects material (interpreted, embodied)
structures under the head of an abstract structure of which they are models,
or when one collects abstract structures in a category, or when one ranks cat-
egories under diﬀerent types: abelian categories, Cartesian closed categories,
complete categories, topos, etc.
A more stratiﬁed task consists of dividing a set in classes of equivalent
elements29 and making up the identity of a class from the equivalence of
its members: quotient group, quotient ring, quotient ﬁeld, etc. Equivalent
Cauchy sequences of rational numbers are identiﬁed for deﬁning the concept
of real number. Similarly, Frege used the process of forming equivalent, namely
equinumerical classes for deﬁning positive cardinal numbers. Russell named
this kind of deﬁnition the abstraction principle; it is the subject of many
philosophical reﬂections, but in mathematics even though it is systematically
used, it is only one abstraction principle, only one way to perform abstraction,
namely forming a quotient structure of some given structure. In particular,
this way must not be confused with those listed in 2. (order structure) and
3. (algebraic structure), where, considering a material structure, we do not
start by deﬁning an equivalence relation on the underlying set of elements,
but we consider the schematic structure itself, independently of the mate-
rial elements, and examine which compatible relations may be matched for
a characterization. Such structural deﬁnitions were not welcome in Frege's
conception. Frege's abstraction principle was not a mathematical novelty; the
novelty lied in introducing a typical mathematical relation, the one-to-one re-
lation, within the scope of logic and presenting this relation as a logical tool
for deﬁning a concept.
More generally, the equivalence relation is involved in classiﬁcation theo-
rems, which answer the question: What are the objects of a given type, up to
some equivalence? Example: the Wedderburn theorem (1908), which states
that every simple ring that is ﬁnite-dimensional over a division ring (a simple
algebra) is a matrix ring; it is a way to unify the real numbers, the complex
numbers, the quaternions and the square matrices under the same structure.
Emil Artin later (1928) generalized this result to the case of Artinian rings
(rings satisfy the descending chain on ideals). Several levels of abstraction are
crossed from the abstract concept of ring to Artin's theorem. Another famous
example is the classiﬁcation of ﬁnite simple groups: every ﬁnite simple group
belongs to one of four classes (cyclic groups, alternating groups, classical Lie
groups, sporadic simple groups). In category theory equivalence is very essen-
tial: one reasons on equivalent categories, i.e., categories related by a functor
29. Elements of an equivalence class satisfy a relation, which is reﬂexive, symmetric,
and transitive.
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F , which has an inverse G, but the composition of F and G is not necessar-
ily the identity mapping; thus equivalence of categories is less restricted than
isomorphism of categories and allows to translate theorems between diﬀerent
kinds of structures.
5. Classiﬁcation is a down top process. Going top down, the converse action
is also a way to show the structure of an entity or a procedure by breaking it
up into simple pieces: e.g., reducing, factorizing a number, a polynomial, an
ideal, in order to unearth the basing building blocks. Generally factorization
and classiﬁcation blend together for producing what was named structure
theorems in the 1930s.30 For instance, Kronecker proved that every ﬁnite
abelian group is uniquely presented as a direct product of cyclic groups of
prime power order; this theorem applies to Galois' theory, to number theory,
and to other theories; it is generalized to ﬁnitely generated abelian groups and
to ﬁnitely generated modules over a principal ideal domain;31 in the latter
case the structure theorem roughly states that ﬁnitely generated modules can
be uniquely decomposed in much the same way that integers have a prime
factorization. That shows deep connections between arithmetic and algebra:
historically that was a result of the project, shared by Kronecker, Dedekind
and Weber, to arithmetize algebra, i.e., to bring to light the analogy between
divisibility of the integers and divisibility of ideals in a ring.
6. Thinking in terms of functional relation, so as to make room for es-
tablishing other identity relations than equality of elements of some set, or
equinumericity between diﬀerent sets, or isomorphisms between distinct mod-
els of this or that structure. In set theory one associates frequently an element
a belonging to a set S to an element α belonging to a set Σ, and one reasons
on α as representative for a. Although one may describe this process by say-
ing that it consists in seeing a as an α, one must underscore that what is at
stake is not the mental content of an idea [Vorstellung ], which would consists
in a psychological association of α with a; what is at stake is the presentation
[Darstellung ] of something as something diﬀerent but similar in some respect,
more exactly the functional association of α with a, which makes α = f(a).
It may happen that it is much easier to get results by reasoning on the image
α rather than directly on the source element a, and then to come back to
a adjusting the obtained results. Dedekind saw a very fundamental way of
mathematical thinking in the ability of the mind to relate things to things, to
30. This expression was commonly used; one can ﬁnd it for instance under Helmut
Hasse's pen [Hasse 1931, 496] (see [Benis Sinaceur 1991, 187191]).
31. Principal ideal domains (PID) behave somewhat like the integers, with respect
to divisibility: any element of a PID has a unique decomposition into prime elements
(so an analogue of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic holds); any two elements
of a PID have a greatest common divisor, although it may not be possible to ﬁnd it
using the Euclidean algorithm.
106 Hourya Benis Sinaceur
let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a thing by a thing [...Dinge
auf Dinge zu beziehen, einem Dinge ein Ding entsprechen zu lassen, oder ein
Ding durch ein Ding abzubilden]. Indeed, a real number x is associated with
a certain class of equivalent Cauchy sequences (xn) of rational numbers, a
rational number p/q may be identiﬁed with the equivalence class of the or-
dered pairs of integers (p, q) with q 6= 0, modulo the relation (p, q) (p′, q′) iﬀ
pq′ = qp′, etc.
More generally, when a structure A is embedded in another structure B
by an injection f , every element a of A is identiﬁed with its image f(a), in
B. f(a) is another way to present a, which then has a multiple identity or,
more exactly, we have for a several distinct representatives that we identify as
referring to the same entity. When f is a bijection, a and f(a) are distinct
but behave in the same way in the structure A and the structure B respec-
tively, A and B being isomorphic. This process turned out to be essential in
category theory. As spotted by J.-P. Marquis: There is no unique, global,
and universal relation of identity for abstract objects. [...] Abstract objects
are of diﬀerent sorts and this should mean, almost by deﬁnition, that there
is no global, universal identity for sorts. Each sort X is equipped with an
internal relation of identity but there is no identity relation that would apply
to all sorts.32
In mathematics, one looks permanently for new presentations of the same en-
tity (or taken to be the same). The concept real number is thought through
diﬀerent presentations, actual (Cauchy's sequences, Dedekind's cuts among
others) or possible, but it must not be confused with anyone of them. In
good cases, diﬀerent presentations for the same entity are provably equiva-
lent in the sense that the meaning of theorems valid in one case is preserved
by theorems valid in the other case. The question of the sameness of referent
through diﬀerent presentations or deﬁnitions poses a diﬃcult epistemological
problem. Mathematics faces this problem constantly and solves it pragmat-
ically by showing, in case it is possible, an equivalence relation between the
entities under consideration.
For instance, topological spaces can be deﬁned in many diﬀerent ways, e.g.,
via open sets, via closed sets, via neighbourhoods (Hausdorﬀ), via conver-
gent ﬁlters, and via closure operations. These deﬁnitions describe essentially
the same objects, what Category theory expresses via the notion of concrete
isomorphism.
7. Probably the most fundamental action is thinking in terms of invariance;
it operates in any mathematical area and corresponds to the task of isolating
intrinsic or stable properties of the object under study. One wants indeed to
32. See [Marquis 2012, 9, fn 20]: Each sort of abstract entity, for example, monoid,
group, ring, ﬁeld, topological space, partial order, etc., has its criterion of identity.
It is certainly a nice feature of category theory that it provides a uniﬁed analysis of
these criteria of identity as being isomorphisms in the appropriate category.
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study not only the structure of some entity but also how it behaves under
transformations. A few examples are below, taken from arithmetic, geometry,
algebra, topology, algebraic topology, and category theory.
 The cardinal number of a set is invariant under the process of counting,
angles are invariant under scalings, rotations, translations and reﬂec-
tions; for any circle the ratio of the circumference to the diameter is
invariant and equal to pi.
 Felix Klein characterized a geometry by a set of geometric invariants
under a given group of symmetries; e.g., lengths, angles and areas are
preserved with respect to the Euclidean group E(n) of isometries (i.e.,
reﬂections, rotations, translations and combinations of these basic oper-
ations), while only the incidence structure and the cross-ratio are pre-
served under the most general projective transformations.
 Sylvester law of inertia: certain properties of the coeﬃcient matrix of a
real quadratic form (homogeneous polynomial of degree 2 in a number n
of variables) remain invariant under a change of coordinates. Expressed
geometrically, the law of inertia says that all maximal subspaces on
which the restriction of the quadratic form is positive deﬁnite (respec-
tively, negative deﬁnite) have the same dimension.
 In Hilbert's invariants theory the ﬁnite basis theorem states that ev-
ery ideal in the ring of multivariate polynomials over a N÷therian ring
is ﬁnitely generated (invariance combined with reduction to a basis).
Translated into algebraic geometry that means that every algebraic set
over a ﬁeld can be described as the set of common roots to a ﬁnite
number of polynomial equations.
 The normal subgroups of a certain group G are the subgroups of G
invariant (stable) under the inner automorphisms of G.
 The dimension of a topological space is invariant under homeomorphism.
 Algebraic invariants are used for classifying topological spaces up to
homeomorphism or, more usually, to homotopy equivalence:33 given
two spaces X and Y , we say they are homotopy-equivalent or of the
same homotopy type if there exist continuous maps f : X → Y and
g : Y → X such that g ◦ f is homotopic to the identity map idX and
f ◦ g is homotopic to idY .
Going further, one deﬁnes the homotopy category as the category whose
objects are topological spaces, and whose morphisms are homotopy
equivalence classes of continuous maps. Two topological spaces X and
Y are isomorphic in this category if and only if they are homotopy-
equivalent. Then a functor on the category of topological spaces is
33. Two continuous functions from one topological space to another are homotopic
iﬀ one can be continuously deformed into the other, such a deformation being called
a homotopy between the two functions.
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homotopy-invariant if it can be expressed as a functor on the homotopy
category.
These examples show that the ideas of functional relation, invariance, equiv-
alence, classiﬁcation, factorization and some others are working together and
are using tools from one area (e.g., arithmetic and algebraic tools respectively)
for characterizing entities belonging to another area (e.g., algebraic number
theory and topological spaces respectively).
5 Conclusion
Mathematical abstraction consists in various processes increasing knowledge;
so I have considered it from its epistemological aspect rather than from its
logical or ontological aspect. The question whether the abstraction process is
logical or psychological gives rise to argument. I think the process has evidently
a logical side and a psychological side, the latter being by now very much
investigated by cognitive scientists and neuroscientists. From the point of
view of mathematical practice, abstraction is an indispensable tool of work and
production. I have been interested here by the multiple ways of constructing
and developing mathematical abstract objects, and I have tried to show which
permanent actions are involved in all those ways.
Abstraction is very often linked with generalization; nevertheless there
are abstract and non general objects, such as Dedekind's integers, which are a
particular model of a general structure, and there are concepts that are equally
abstract but have a diﬀerent degree of generality: e.g., the concept of group is
as abstract as the concept of ﬁeld and it is more general. I had personally no
example of a general procedure or entity, which would not involve abstraction
at some level. J.-P. Marquis gives the example of passing from the notion of
continuity of a function f : R→ R at a point to that of continuity over a real
interval [Marquis forthcoming, 17]. That leads me to think that generalization
can sometimes be made without using abstracting processes, while any process
of abstraction involves generalization.
Mathematical abstraction has more than one way; it is not limited to
Aristotelian concept formation even though conceptualization, that is to say
forming concepts by various procedures, is one essential way and is very char-
acteristic of modern mathematics. Moreover, diﬀerent ways are simultaneously
used in constructions of higher and higher levels.
Some ways are known from the beginnings: idealization (geometrical
shapes), invariance (invariant ratio between lengths or integers), factorizing
(integers).
Other ways are more speciﬁc of modern mathematics:
 making a whole from an inﬁnite number of unspeciﬁed elements,
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 manipulating symbols, formulae, diagrams, sets of axioms as being,
rather than expressing mathematical objects,
 setting up analogies between apparently diﬀerent objects, sets, struc-
tures, theorems, etc., and correlatively dealing with classes of structures
and theorems,
 considering functional relations or correspondences between elements,
structures, functors,
 thematizing:
 viewing operations of one level as objects of the successor level,
 dealing with abstract structures and proving structure theorems
with the help of structure-preserving maps,
 considering equivalent classes of elements, of structures, of mor-
phisms, etc., and proving classiﬁcation theorems, transferring the-
orems between categories, etc.
The variety, wide enough, of the examples I have recalled shows that the
notion of mathematical abstraction is plural and ﬂexible. The abstraction
process is open: new steps towards higher levels yielding more abstract, more
sophisticated, and more encompassing concepts are to be expected.
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